

sen by the leaders of the Crimean Tatar civic movement and will be applied to every-day civic, socio-economic, political and cultural interaction between the Crimean Tatars and other groups of Crimean inhabitants are still uncertain.

### **3.2 Analysis of Publications<sup>31</sup>**

Creating conditions for social integration based on equal rights, freedom and obligations of citizens is a rather challenging task of public policy in multiethnic societies. The need for interethnic integration was prompted on the Crimean peninsula by the mix of ethnic communities, which have long been separated. Several laws supporting the people that were deported and numerous programmes were adopted and implemented in Ukraine. They aimed at resolving the complex issues connected with their repatriation. Nevertheless, M.A. Shulga clearly stated in 2002 that “as a whole the problems of the Crimean Tatars settlement are still open”.<sup>32</sup> Under the recent internal and external challenges the issues connected with the resettlement of the Crimean Tatars became even acute. The problems of consolidation of the population on the peninsula and particularly the integration of the Crimean Tatars into Ukrainian society reached alarming intensity.

Therefore, the monitoring of the Crimean Tatars’ situation is relevant for both social sciences and policy-making. The analysis of the communication between interest groups presented in public discourse helps to understand the positions of the actors and to forecast their behaviour.

#### **3.2.1 Characteristics of the data base**

The socio-economic and political situation of the Crimean Tatars in Ukraine is intensely covered by the national and the regional press. The press media can be roughly divided into ‘serious’ and tabloid papers. The former are characterised by informational saturation and analytical approach to social events while the latter attract readership with their focus on sensational news stories, dramatic

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<sup>31</sup>The author of the paragraph is Larisa Khizhnyak.

<sup>32</sup> Shulga, N.A. (2002) *Velikaya immigratsiya: repatriaty , bezhentsy, trudovye migranty...*, p.127.



style and lack of a detailed analysis<sup>33</sup>. Only the 'serious' press served as information base for the monitoring. The monitoring itself was held in two stages: from 01 October, 2005 till 31 March, 2006 and from 01 October, 2006 till 31 December, 2006. The monitoring covered the following periodicals (6 national and 5 regional/ Crimean):

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|---|---|
| <p>«<i>Golos Ukraini</i>», a daily newspaper</p> <p>«<i>Uryadoviy Kur'er</i>», a daily newspaper</p> <p>«<i>Den'</i>», a daily newspaper</p> <p>«<i>2000</i>», a weekly</p> <p>«<i>Zerkalo Nedeli</i>», a weekly</p> <p>«<i>Correspondent</i>», a magazine</p> <p>«<i>Krymskaya Gazeta</i>», a daily newspaper</p> <p>«<i>Krymskaya Pravda</i>», a daily newspaper</p> <p>«<i>Golos Kryma</i>», a weekly</p> <p>«<i>Tavricheskie Vedomosti</i>», a daily newspaper</p> <p>«<i>Respublika Krym</i>», a daily newspaper</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ a newspaper of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (the Supreme Council)</li> <li>▪ a newspaper of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine</li> <li>▪ a national newspaper</li> <li>▪ a national newspaper</li> <li>▪ a socio-political weekly</li> <li>▪ a Ukrainian socio-political and analytical weekly</li> <li>▪ a newspaper of the Cabinet of Ministers of the AR Crimea</li> <li>▪ a regional socio-political independent Russian newspaper of Ukraine</li> <li>▪ a supplement to "Golos Ukraini" aiming at the Crimean Tatar audience</li> <li>▪ a regional informational and analytical daily</li> <li>▪ a regional socio-political newspaper</li> </ul> |
|---|---|

The analysis revealed that the interest of the regional media in problems of the Crimean Tatars is considerably lower than that of the national press. The problems of the Crimean Tatars in Ukraine are usually highlighted in the independent and official press, and receive considerably less attention in oppositional national periodicals. At regional level the share of the ethnically oriented press is

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<sup>33</sup> See Koroljok V.G. (2003) *The Strategy and Tactics of Communication with the Community for the Third Sector Organizations*. Kyiv: The Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine, p. 144.



represented by a bigger number of publications. The information flow is mainly formed by newspapers aimed at the Crimean Tatar audience.

**Table 3.3**

**The information flow regarding Crimean Tatar issues in the national and regional press at the two monitoring stages (the number of messages)**

The Crimean Tatar Issues in the press	In total	First period from 01.10.2005 till 31.03.2006	Second period from 01.10.2006 till 31.12.2006
National periodicals	92	60	32
Regional (Crimean) Periodicals	136	105	31
Total	228	165	63

### **3.2.2 Dynamics of interest to the Crimean Tatar Issues**

The structure of the publications in national and regional publications is basically the same and remained constant throughout the two monitoring stages. More than half of the publications (56 %) referred to one-day events, in particular in the ethno-oriented press. One third of all publications (35 %) contained information referring to long-term events. Independent editions primarily focused on long-term events that made it possible to reveal their causes, results and risks. Publications on short-term and infrequent events mostly appeared in the national official editions. This is mainly due to the fact that the official press informs about official events in the form of brief messages on visits, jubilees, conferences, etc. Similarly, the national as well as the regional press showed preference to past events.

The monitoring was focused on events of the Crimean Tatar life with location in the AR Crimea. Over the period under scrutiny the share of these publications decreased from 59 % to 44 %. At the same time a growing interest of the press to local events (from 27 % to 38 %) was registered.



Table 3.4

**Distribution of publications in the press by the scale of the event**  
(in per cent)

Scale of the event	In total, N=228	The first period: from 01.10.2005 to 31.03.2006, n=165	The second period: from 1.10.2006 to 31.12.2006, n=63
1. International	8	7	11
2. National	10	11	6
3. Regional (in the country under scrutiny)	55	59	44
4. Local	27	23	39
Total	100	100	100

The national press tends to regionalise or even localise the coverage of the Crimean Tatar situation. This tendency is preserved at regional level, where social activities are mostly presented at the regional and local community levels. However, there is a noteworthy increase in the share of publications where Crimean Tatar issues reach the international level. They comprised 7 % of the relevant publications over the first monitoring period and reached 11 % over the second period. This is basically due to the international organisations' activities on realisation of projects. The assistance of international organisations to the reintegration of deported people (including the Crimean Tatars) into Ukrainian society is rather positively evaluated in the official press. Special attention is paid to the *Programme for Development and Integration of the Crimea* (PDIC PRUNO). The national official press considers two types of projects in a particularly positive way:

1) *Support on the provision of social services for the population.* These projects have humanitarian aims. They are intended to involve the local communities in order to foster life by mutual ethnic tolerance and cooperation in solving social and economic problems. The projects are usually financed by various sources. For instance, the PDIC PRUNO project on water-supply improvement in the areas inhabited by repatriates was supported by the *Turkish international agency on cooperation* together with the *Republican Committee on Nationalities and Former Deported Citizens of the AR Crimea*. Over 10 years more than \$ 13



millions have been invested into PDIC PRUNO. The programme covers 12 cities and areas of the Crimea, with 150 000 people engaged into it.<sup>34</sup>

2) *Support of the civil NGOs promoting ethno-political consolidation.* In October, 2006 the *Council on Security and Development* was established, under the President of the *Supreme Council of the AR Crimea*. One of its goals is to develop recommendations for resolving ethnic and interreligious problems and to promote a stable development of the multinational Crimean peninsula.<sup>35</sup> The *US Agency on International Development* (USAID) initiated the project 'Reforms of the local budgets' in Ukraine which will be financially supported by USAID for three years.<sup>36</sup>

The local and regional events in the Crimea reached international scale particularly because of the practice of the Crimean Tatars to address international organisations when seeking support to their needs. The participants of the Crimean Tatar congress of December 2006 adopted a resolution to call on the *Council of Europe*, the OSCE and the UN *Commissioner for Human Rights* for to take immediate actions. The Congress demanded to send a factfinding group to Ukraine for *studying the situation* of land allotment to the former deportees since it seemed impossible to solve the conflict without external intervention.

### **3.2.3 Participants in events involving the Crimean Tatar minority**

The regionalisation of Crimean Tatar issues and the growing attention at the level of national and regional authorities can be proved by the information on participants in the events as presented in publications. Most frequently representatives of local authorities and national or regional state institutions are depicted as players in the events. Their actions are being primarily analysed by official and independent publications. At the level of the supreme legislative body of Ukraine, the *Verkhovna Rada*, an attempt was made to reconsider the compensations of formerly repressed persons. The bill *On restoration of the rights of the deported on ethnic basis* was passed. Although there is no direct reference to the Crimean Tatar people in this text, the law directly concerns their interests since they were thus provided with higher compensations.<sup>37</sup> In this context the understanding prevailed that it was the incompetence of local (regional) authorities

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<sup>34</sup> *Golos Ukraini*. № 201 of 27.10.2006

<sup>35</sup> *Golos Ukraini*. № 195 of 19.10.2006

<sup>36</sup> *Golos Ukraini*. № 191 of 13.10.2006, p. 2

<sup>37</sup> *Golos Ukraini*. № 215-216 of 16.11.2006, p.3



### **3.2.4 Forms and character of publications as a reaction to events**

The prevalent form of publications in national and in the regional Crimean press is fact related information. This form of presentation is preferred by official publications. However, the second monitoring period is marked by a moderate decrease of this category and an increase in the number of interviews, speeches and reports with comments.

**Table 3.5**

#### **Reaction to events: form of publications (% of messages, N=223)**

Form of publication	In total	First period: from 01.10.2005 to 31.03.2006	Second period: from 01.10.2006 to 31.12.2006
1. Information on facts	45	44	28
2. Publication of document(s)	4	5	2
3. Interviews, speeches	22	19	32
4. Commented messages, reports with comments	15	12	24
5. Analytical articles	12	13	9
6. Monograph, collection of articles	6	7	5
Total	100	100	100

Publications on international relations primarily belong to the domain of the official press. Commented messages and reports with comments frequently are presented in the independent press and less frequently in the official periodicals. Analytical articles are mainly published in the independent press. Public interviews and speeches are rarely published in the national official press. The regional Crimean oppositional and ethno-oriented press focuses on facts, reports with comments, public interviews and speeches. In their interviews with Crimean Tatar leaders the Crimean Tatar press advocates ethnic ideas, consolidates the ethnic community, informs and mobilizes for participation in actions. The subjects presented in the publications prevailed during both monitoring periods. The tendency to present the reaction of the regional authorities and international organisations was persistent.



**Table 3.6**

**Whose reaction is presented in the publications?**  
(multiple choice, % of messages)

Whose reaction is presented:	In total	First period: 01.10.2005 - 31.03.2006	Second period: 01.10.2006 - 31.12.2006
1. Ordinary representative(-es) of the Tatar Minority	5	3	10
2. Leaders, successful representatives of the ethnic minority	9	10	7
3. Representatives of other ethnic group(-s)	5	3	8
4. Tatars' ethnic party, movement	2	2	3
5. Other political party, social movement etc.	5	6	2
6. Religious organisation, movement	1	2	-
7. Representatives of firms, enterprises, etc.	3	2	3
8. Journalists, publishers	67	68	65
9. Local authority	10	9	12
10. Regional (in the scale of the country) authority	12	9	22
11. National authority	9	10	5
12. International organizations	3	2	7

At national level publications involving the Crimean Tatar minority primarily offer the reactions of editors and journalists to events as well as reactions of regional and central authority. The Crimean regional editions follow the same pattern with the exception of the ethnic press. In addition to the editors' and journalists' position, the Crimean Tatar newspapers more often highlight the position and reaction of the leaders and successful representatives of their own ethnic group. The articles in national official editions, articles in the mass media editions of the Crimean Tatar representatives and articles in the regional official press remain the prevalent publication modes of the reaction to the Crimean Tatar situation.



The ambiguous situation in the Crimea affects the emotional orientation of the publications about events and reactions to them. By this criterion the distribution of publications is extremely uneven: 47 % of the analysed sources maintained a neutral orientation, 29 % – a negative and only 24 % – a positive. Negative emotions overwhelmed the events presentation in the Crimean oppositional press compared to the ethnic and official regional press.

**Table 3.7**

**Emotional orientation of the main event (% of messages, N=223)**

Emotional orientation	In total	First period: 01.10.2005 to 31.03.2006	Second period: 01.10.2006 to 31.12.2006
1. Positive	24	22	31
2. Neutral	47	46	48
3. Negative	29	32	21
Total	100	100	100

More than half of the events under scrutiny received a neutral evaluation. Every third publication contains support and only some 8 % of the analyzed cases hold disagreement. In other words, the vast majority of publications in the national press presents a neutral evaluation of the event in question. Disagreement is primarily found in the publications of the Crimean regional oppositional press.

**Table 3.8**

**Evaluative orientation of the publication (% of messages, N=217)**

Evaluation of the event	In total	First period: 01.10.2005 to 31.03.2006	Second period: 01.10.2006 to 31.12.2006
1. Basically supporting	25	27	22
2. Partially supporting	8	7	9
3. Neutral	59	57	62
4. Objection	8	9	7
Total	100	100	100



### 3.2.5 Dynamics of the interethnic conflict

About half of the monitored publications do not contain conflict potential in the reports about events. Yet, in the second monitoring period the publications were marked by a rapid increase of such reports (from 17 % to 30 %).

*Table 3.9*

#### **Conflict potential of the events presented in the press (% of messages)**

Type of the event	In total, N=228	First period: 01.10.2005 to 31.03.2006, n=165	Second period: 01.10.2006 to 31.12.2006, n = 63
1. Non-conflict	50	52	43
2. Low-intensity conflict	30	31	27
3. High-intensity conflict	20	17	30
Total	100	100	100

When presenting the Crimean Tatar issue, the national press generally demonstrates prudence supported by the predominance of reports on non-conflict and low-conflict events. The conflict potential of those events was to a greater extent reflected by independent and oppositional newspapers and weeklies. The regional press is more likely to filter information, thus tending to mitigate the presentation of 'hot issues'. The quantity of events with a high conflict potential in the regional press is even less than in the national. Unlike the ethno-oriented press, demonstration of prudence and unwillingness to deteriorate the situation in the Crimea is typical for the oppositional and official press in the Crimea. Over the two monitoring periods there was a decrease in the number of non-violent forms of conflict from 84% to 56% in the publications presenting conflict. At the same time there was an increasing number of publications on conflicts (including massive and armed conflicts).



Table 3.10

**Distribution of publications by forms of conflict (% of messages)**

Forms of the conflict	In total, N=228	First period: 01.10.2005 to 31.03.2006, n=165	Second period: 01.10.2006 to 31.12.2006, n = 63
1. Non-violent	75	84	56
2. Separate clashes	17	14	25
3. Massive clashes	2	1	3
4. Armed conflicts	6	1	16
Total	100	100	100

In the national press there is a clear preference to publish news stories when conflicts - if there are any - are not violent. Clashes are more frequently mentioned in the independent editions. Reports on events with the highest conflict potential are related to the aggravation of the land issues in the Crimea. Recently some ways of solving the land issue were introduced on the peninsula. However, land allotment and cadastre issues remain of primary importance. In the official national press the Crimean land situation involving the Crimean Tatars was presented primarily under the following aspects:

a) *Land and cultural heritage preservation* (reference to the protest actions against the illegal construction of a café in the Massandra park in October, 2006);

b) *Land and house-building*, land allotment for building of the repatriates' houses, land self-acquisition. There were 45 land self-acquisition actions recorded in 6 areas of the Crimea in November 2006. Since summer 2006 there have been 1.3 thousand hectares illegally acquired in Simferopol and its suburbs only. Almost 15 thousand Crimean citizens of various ethnicities took part in these actions.<sup>40</sup>

c) *Land as a recreation resource*. It has constantly been emphasised that the Crimean coast (including the area of the already existing health centres and centennial parks) has been covered with buildings, belonging to the elite, while pensions and hotels were lacking. Recently the official national press started paying attention to land self-acquisition in the Crimea and published analytical

<sup>40</sup> *Golos Ukraini*. № 213 of 14.11.2006, p.8



reports. Referring to the statistics, the *Republican committee on land planning of the AR Crimea* claimed that all previous deportees have long been provided with land allotments. The following calculation was brought to attention: Having multiplied the 76,738 allotments apportioned to the repatriates and given that an average Crimean Tatar family consists of four people, there would have been benefitted more than 280 thousand people. In reality, there are less than 250 thousand repatriates, many of whom were provided with apartments due to the programme for provision of facilities for the repatriates. Analysts therefore claim that the 'land problem' is artificially aggravated by the internal migration both of Crimean Tatars and Slavs who seek to abandon the depressive rural areas and strive for land at the expensive Crimean east littoral and around territories where it is easier to find work.<sup>41</sup>

*Thus, the Crimean Tatar factor was used in information wars.* The official national press reports on tense interethnic relations sparked by Crimean Tatar demonstrations, which proved to be an extremely effective move in the murky game. In the Crimea, as the most developed touristic area of Ukraine, the tourist industry comprised 7-10 % of the AR Crimea budget. Over recent years, despite administrative efforts and investments, Crimea has been losing the competition to Turkey, Egypt, Montenegro, Croatia, Spain and North Africa.<sup>42</sup>

The period of the two monitorings is characterized by an increasing number of conflict reports (from 26 % to 46 %), while the issue of conflict solving was not raised, i.e. there were no constructive proposals on its resolution.

**Table 3.11**

**Presence of proposals on the conflict resolution (% of messages)**

Conflict resolution	In total N=228	First period: 01.10.2005 to 31.03.2006, n=165	Second period: 01.10.2006 to 31.12.2006, n=63
1. Constructive proposals	25	26	23
2. Actions for conflict resolution are undertaken	43	48	31
3. Constructive proposals are absent	32	26	46
Total	100	100	100

<sup>41</sup> *Golos Ukraini*. № 196 of 20.10.2006

<sup>42</sup> *Golos Ukraini*. № 198 of 24.10.2006, p.6



Yet, almost a quarter of the reported conflicts were accompanied by constructive proposals or actions. The majority of the national press publications on conflict events contained constructive proposals or some suggestions and recommendations concerning conflict resolution.

**Table 3.12**

**Presence of critical or protest (% of messages, N=220)**

Critical / protest notions	In total	First period: 01.10.2005 to 31.03.2006	Second period: 01.10.2006 to 31.12.2006
1. Absent	59	61	54
2. Flabby criticisms	16	13	23
3. Sharp criticisms	22	23	20
4. Protest is expressed	3	3	3
Total	100	100	100

More than half of the publications (59%) lacked protest or critical remarks, while 16 % of the publications were characterized by flabby criticisms, 22 % by sharp criticisms, and only 3 % of the monitored messages contained sharp criticism/protest.

When discussing the resolution of Crimean Tatar issues, the regional editions move to the Crimean Tatar opposition zone where most unpredictable and contradictory points of view come into clash. This can partially explain the fact that the regional Crimean press (especially independent editions) reports less on conflict events with less constructive proposals. On the whole, the national and regional mass media tend to remain objective in presenting and evaluating facts concerning the Crimean Tatar problems. *The frequency of publications on the Crimean Tatar aspirations for independence and self-determination remained the same during the two monitored periods.* Approximately 26 % of 155 monitored publications somehow reflected events where the Crimean Tatars' aspiration for more independence was made visible. *The majority of messages (about 72 %) both in the national and in the regional press were not focused on the Crimean Tatar aspiration for independence.*



*Table 3.13*

**If the event is related to the attempt of the minority to gain more independence, in what sphere? (% of messages, N = 60)**

If the event is related to the attempt of the minority to be more independent, in what sphere?	In total	First period: 01.10.2005 to 31.03.2006	Second period: 01.10.2006 to 31.12.2006
1. Control of natural resources	3	4	-
2. Privatization of production assets (enterprises, land)	10	7	17
3. Executive authorities	-	-	-
4. Status of the ethnic minority language, its usage	19	26	-
5. Political independence, state sovereignty	39	44	35
6. Other	29	19	48
Total	100	100	100

Most events indirectly indicate that the Crimean Tatar people seek more independence when taking part in political and cultural actions or celebrate anniversaries of their outstanding predecessors. The publishers express prudence on this issue and tend not to attract public attention to the Crimean Tatar aspiration to be more independent and even give lip service to a number of the events somehow pointing at the minority's resentment over their status and limited independence. The Crimean Tatar aspiration for state sovereignty and political independence is more likely to be discussed in national independent editions as compared to the national official and oppositional press. At regional level the problem was rarely touched upon in the oppositional and the Crimean Tatar press. The messages primarily covered issues such as privatization, the course of which is considered to be the subject of the minority's prudence, the status of the ethnic language and also issues related to political independence and state sovereignty.

Crimean Tatar leaders are rather cautious about their statements concerning the minority's aspiration to achieve autonomy. In his interview for an oppositional newspaper, Refat Chubarov, the vice president of the Majlis and deputy in the Verkhovna Rada ('Our Ukraine' faction), stressed that Crimean Tatar people



refer to the Crimea as to an ethnic territorial unit. In reality, the AR Crimea is 'de jure' a territorial autonomy without a definition of the ethnic subject of self-determination. That is why the Crimean Tatar representatives particularly insist on the 'ethnic' ascription: In their viewpoint, the Ukrainian legislation has to provide special legislative processes that would guarantee the development of the Crimean Tatar people in particular<sup>43</sup>.

### **3.2.6 Stereotypes in the publications**

When reporting on conflicts at national and regional levels, most of the analysed publications (88 %) *did not employ ethnically coloured stereotypes*. However, in the Crimean regional ethnic press stereotypes were present. Among the highlighted stereotypes 19 referred to the Crimean Tatars, one referred to the titular ethnic group of the country and seven cases referred to other ethnic groups. *Historically based* stereotypes were present in seven publications to a greater extent and in eight publications to a lesser extent. Morally oriented stereotypes were distributed in the following way: three publications with a positive orientation, 15 with a negative orientation and six with a neutral one.

The *new* fact is that historical stereotypes and related inaccuracies started entering the educational literature. In 2006 the USA State Department on democracy, human rights and trade worked out and passed to the American Congress an international report on religious freedom, where the following was stated: 'The Majlis members and the Crimean human rights organisations continue criticising the Crimean government for allowing the coursebooks, containing humiliating and historically inaccurate data on the Tatar Moslems, to be used in high schools.'<sup>44</sup> Our monitoring data indirectly confirm the conclusions made during the 2002 sociological study conducted by the State Institute of Family and Youth Problems (Kyiv). The study paid attention to the discontent of Crimean Tatars concerning the lacking interest among other ethnic groups to know the history, traditions and customs of the Crimean Tatars. This aggravates the adaptation process for repatriates.<sup>45</sup> One should point out the fertile ground for negative stereotypes concerning the Crimean Tatars in Ukraine. Ethnic stereo-

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<sup>43</sup> «2000» of 1.12.2005, p. 6

<sup>44</sup> «2000» of 13.10.2006, p. 5

<sup>45</sup> Yaryemenko, O.O.; Ganyukov, A. O. (2003): *Social Guiding Lines, Needs and Interests of the Crimean Tatar Youth: Analytical Report*. Kyiv: State Institute of Families and Youth Problems, p. 10-11. /in Ukrainian/



types are caused by the low ethnic tolerance within Ukrainian society. Researchers explain the intolerance concerning Crimean Tatars with the widespread association of this ethnic group with the threat of interethnic conflicts.<sup>46</sup>

### 3.2.7 Social consequences of the events

The unwillingness of the press to attract public attention to interethnic issues affects the presentation of the risk potential of events. Some 56 % of the publications lacked any evaluation of the risk potential. The available evaluations of risk were distributed in the following way: middle risk potential prevailed in 28% of the reported events, high level of risk potential in 9 % and low risk was identified in 7 %. The findings are distributed during the two periods of monitoring as follows:

**Table 3.14**

**Evaluation of risks (% of messages, N=219)**

Evaluation of risks of an event	In total	First period: 01.10.2005 to 31.03.2006	Second period: 01.10.2006 to 31.12.2006
1. High level	9	9	9
2. Middle level	28	25	39
3. Low level	7	7	6
4. Risk is absent	56	59	46
Total	100	100	100

The national and regional mass media presents risks as primarily limited to the Crimean region, i.e. consider them to be regional (44 %) or local (18 %). This interpretation accounts for almost two thirds of the analyzed publications with risk potential. The same standpoint prevails in the official and independent press as well. Some 22 % of the analyzed publications evaluate the events as posing danger at national level.

<sup>46</sup> Panina, N. (2002) National Tolerance, national isolationism, and xenophobia in Ukraine. In: Vorona, B.; Shulga, N. (Eds.): Ukraine-2002: Monitoring of Social Changes. Kyiv: Institute of Sociology NAN Ukraine Publisher, 2002, p. 450 (*in Russian*)



*Table 3.15*

**Distribution of events containing evaluation of danger by risk/danger scale (% of messages, N=99)**

Type of identified risk	In total	First period: 01.10.2005 to 31.03.2006	Second period: 01.10.2006 to 31.12.2006
1. International	2	3	-
2. National	22	23	19
3. Regional	44	37	58
4. Local	18	18	20
5. Within the ethnic minority	14	19	3
Total	100	100	100

Domestic policy together with humanitarian, economic, and cultural issues take priority in all 'risky' spheres of interethnic relations in the Crimea. Official national mass media tend to consider the economic sphere as a basic sphere of risk, i.e. unsolved economic problems of the Crimean Tatars are conceived to spark off interethnic conflicts. The oppositional and independent national press prioritizes domestic policy, the vagueness of which blocks the resolving of interethnic problems.

*Table 3.16*

**Distribution of events containing evaluation of risk according to the sphere of risk (multiple choice, % of messages, N=124)**

Major areas of identified risk	In total	First period: 01.10.2005 to 31.03.2006	Second period: 01.10.2006 to 31.12.2006
1. Geopolitical	7	2	17
2. Domestic politics	39	45	27
3. Economic	24	23	27
4. Cultural	26	29	20
5. Humanitarian	38	42	30
6. Environmental	1	1	-



The publications under scrutiny cultivate the idea that the core of the risk potential in the Crimea primarily stems from the actions of national (40 %), regional (28 %) and local (25 %) authorities. There was an increase in the number of publications ascribing the risks to the Crimean Tatar ethnic group itself. This was most probably caused by the clashes between Crimean Tatars with other ethnic groups of the Crimean population in the course of land self-acquisition.

**Table 3.17**

**Who or what causes the risk (multiple choice, % of messages, N=97)**

<i>Who (what) causes the risk</i>	In total	First period: 01.10.2005 to 31.03.2006	Second period: 01.10.2006 to 31.12.2006
1. The Tatar minority	14	3	38
2. Leaders, representing the ethnic Minority	22	22	21
3. Representatives of other ethnic group(-s)	10	3	24
4. Tatars' ethnic party, movement	5	6	3
5. Other political party, movement etc.	2	2	3
6. Religious organisation, movement	3	3	3
7. Firms, enterprises, etc.	7	8	7
8. Local authorities	25	25	24
9. Regional authority	28	32	21
10. National authority	40	46	28
11. Other states	6	3	14
12. International organizations, associations etc.	1	-	3

The oppositional regional press considers the leaders and some of the Crimean Tatar representatives to be the root of all evil. This confirms the assumption that there is a latent ethnic conflict in the Crimea.



### 3.2.8 Conclusions

1. Over the period between October 2005 and December 2006 the content of the publications in the national and regional press underwent changes due to the political tensions during and after the parliamentary elections in Ukraine. During the first three months before the elections to the Ukrainian Supreme Council and local authorities (October - December 2005) publications were devoted to the cultural identity or the social and economic status of the Crimean Tatars. Later the focus shifted to the complicated political life in the Crimea and to the political aspirations of the Crimean Tatar ethnic minority.

2. Both national and regional press maintain a certain distance to the Crimean opposition and tend to present events as primarily non-conflict or low conflict. This media policy reflects the intention not to aggravate the interethnic situation in the Crimea. Half of the publications under monitoring are not conflict focused. However, the focusing on the conflict potential of the presented events increased sharply in the second monitoring period (from 17 % to 30 %). Those events with a high conflict and risk potential basically arose from the aggravation of the land conflict and the violation of rights of the Crimean Tatar population.

3. The heterogeneity of the media space in the Crimea was vividly revealed in the published data on the Crimean Tatar situation. The ethnically oriented press shows some radical tendencies. They stress the coexistence of the two different information flows: one supports the Russian speaking population, the other appeals to the Crimean Tatar audience.

The regional official editions support the position of the national government, literally abstaining from publishing critical articles and news stories about inter-ethnic relations in the Crimea. The regional oppositional publications appear to be less loyal.

*"Krymskaya Pravda"* is a socio-political independent Russian newspaper. The paper frequently attacks the Majlis calling it 'a group of criminals' or 'an illegal ethnic parliament'. There are extremely radical articles about the Crimean Tatar minority published in this newspaper, particularly in its headlines. The latter are much harsher than the articles themselves. The tensions between the Crimean Tatar and the Russian speaking population stem mainly from politics and territorial questions.

*"Golos Kryma"* is a regional newspaper of the Crimean Tatar ethnic minority. The newspaper publishes various articles about the Crimean Tatars' life. The ar-



ticles are frequently critically oriented and present viewpoints similar to those of the Majlis members and their supporters.

4. The publications reflect a *growing involvement of international organisations* into the Crimean Tatar situation. The current situation is rather alarming since the participation of external interests in such sensitive internal interethnic relations may help to solve conflicts but might also spark an uncontrolled conflict escalation. Researchers noted that there are extreme expectations among the Crimean Tatars concerning external support. There is an opinion that “the adaptation processes are deliberately curtailed by the public leaders of the Crimean Tatars people in order to emphasize their own specific status for the benefit of obtaining particular political, economic and other advantages”<sup>47</sup>.

### **3.3 Lingua-conflictological Analysis of the Official Media Discourse**

#### **3.3.1 Major outcomes of content analysis and lingua-conflictological analysis<sup>48</sup>**

The content analysis is focused on the daily Russian language newspaper *Krymskiye izvestiya* and on its Saturday supplement *Krymskiy dialog* printed in Ukrainian. The analysis is carried out over the period from October 2005 to March 2006. Being the official organ of the *Verkhovna Rada* in the Crimea, the newspaper reflects the peculiarities of the Crimean Tatars issues at various levels. The regional newspaper discourse on ethnic conflicts and the Crimean *Verkhovna Rada*'s reaction to the ethnic conflicts share very much the text structures and ways of reacting to the conflict typical for the Soviet discourse.<sup>49</sup> This point will be elaborated further on by analyzing other sources of information. The aim will be to find out different 'images' of real and potential conflicts. In order to resolve the task, two techniques of analyzing and interpreting text material were applied:

1. The qualitative-quantitative content-analysis of the newspaper “*Krymskiye Izvestiya*” followed the assigned scheme common for conducting content-analysis of publications relevant for the InterEthno research project.

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<sup>47</sup> Yaryemenko O.O.; Ganyukov, O. A., op.cit., pp. 10-11.

<sup>48</sup> The author of the paragraph is Oxana Danylenko.

<sup>49</sup> For instance, “The Crimea is steadily moving towards social and economic progress”, “The Crimea boasts its hero”, etc.